Difference between revisions of "Less-is-More Effect"
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| − | * "Among the evience for the empirical validity of the Take The Best algorithm are the tests of a bold prediction, the less-is-more effect, which postulates conditions under which people with little knowledge make better inferences than those who more. This surprising prediction has been experimentally confirmed. For instance, U.S. students make slightly more correct inferences about German dity populations (about which the know little) than about U.S. cities, and vice versa for German students (Gigerenzer, 1993<ref>Gigerencer 1993</ref>; ) | + | * "Among the evience for the empirical validity of the Take The Best algorithm are the tests of a bold prediction, the less-is-more effect, which postulates conditions under which people with little knowledge make better inferences than those who more. This surprising prediction has been experimentally confirmed. For instance, U.S. students make slightly more correct inferences about German dity populations (about which the know little) than about U.S. cities, and vice versa for German students (Gigerenzer, 1993<ref>Gigerencer, G. (1993). The bounded rationality of probabilistic mental models. In K.I. Manktelow & D.E. Over (Eds.), ''Rationality: Psychological and philosophical perspectives'' (pp. 284-313). London: Routledge</ref>; Goldstein, 1994<ref>Gigerenzer, G. (1994). Why the distinction between single-event probabilities and frequencies is relevant for psychology (and vice versa). In G. Wright & P. Avion (Eds.), ''Subjective probability''' (pp. 129-161). New York: Wiley.</ref>; Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 1995<ref>Note wiki-editor: I have not found this reference in the article!</ref>; Hoffrage, 1994<ref>Hoffrage, U. (1994). Zur Angemessenheit subjektiver Sicherheits-Urteile: Eine Exploration der Theorie der probabilistischen mentalen Modelle [On the validity of confidence judgments: A study of the theory of probabilistic mental models]. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Universität Salzburg, Austria.</ref>)".<ref>[[Reasoning the Fast and Frugal Way: Models of Bounded Rationality]]</ref> |
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Latest revision as of 20:43, 28 February 2016
Keep in mind that this article is under construction (28FEB16_aabrilru)
References found in biography
- "Among the evience for the empirical validity of the Take The Best algorithm are the tests of a bold prediction, the less-is-more effect, which postulates conditions under which people with little knowledge make better inferences than those who more. This surprising prediction has been experimentally confirmed. For instance, U.S. students make slightly more correct inferences about German dity populations (about which the know little) than about U.S. cities, and vice versa for German students (Gigerenzer, 1993[1]; Goldstein, 1994[2]; Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 1995[3]; Hoffrage, 1994[4])".[5]
Notes and References
- ↑ Gigerencer, G. (1993). The bounded rationality of probabilistic mental models. In K.I. Manktelow & D.E. Over (Eds.), Rationality: Psychological and philosophical perspectives (pp. 284-313). London: Routledge
- ↑ Gigerenzer, G. (1994). Why the distinction between single-event probabilities and frequencies is relevant for psychology (and vice versa). In G. Wright & P. Avion (Eds.), Subjective probability' (pp. 129-161). New York: Wiley.
- ↑ Note wiki-editor: I have not found this reference in the article!
- ↑ Hoffrage, U. (1994). Zur Angemessenheit subjektiver Sicherheits-Urteile: Eine Exploration der Theorie der probabilistischen mentalen Modelle [On the validity of confidence judgments: A study of the theory of probabilistic mental models]. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Universität Salzburg, Austria.
- ↑ Reasoning the Fast and Frugal Way: Models of Bounded Rationality
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